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I. INTRODUCTION

A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellants ask this Court to vacate a binding arbitration decision. Afier considering the
extremely narrow scope of review of an arbitrator's decision and finding no grounds to vacate the
award, the District Court confirmed the arbitration award. (R. Vol. I, p. 2 16-18.)
This dispute arises out of the failure of adoctor, Dr. Jeffrey Hartford to abstain from drinking
alcohol, a condition on his license to practice medicine by the Idaho State Board of Medicine and
a requirement for insurance coverage for Appellants' medical malpractice claim. (CE 7, p. 2-4.)

'

The doctor's insurance policy contained a Special Endorsement excluding coverage if the doctor
consumed

alcohol. (Id.)Dr. Hartford admitted he violated the terms of the licensing conditions,

thus admitted breaching the terms of his insurance policy, excluding coverage for Appellants'
malpractice claim. (Id.) Appellant H. Ray Harrison received treatment from Dr. Hartford during the
time frame when Dr. Hartford admitted he had been drinking. (Id.; R. Vol. I, p. 78.) Dr. Hartford is
an alcoholic and admitted he relapsed in 2001 and drank weekly until 2004, when he checked into
rehab. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. I, p. 20.) Appellant Julie ~arrison', who spoke with Dr. Hartford at the
hospital testified Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol on several occasions. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. 1, p. 18.)
H. Ray Harrison contends he was injured as a result of Dr. Hartford's medical malpractice.

'"CE" refers to the Certificate of Exhibits, R. Vol. I, p. 232.
H. Ray and Julie Harrison will be referred to collectively as "the Hanisons."

2

(R. Vol. I , p. 80.) The Harrisons filed a lawsuit against Dr. Hartford. (Id., p.6.) Respondent Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds London subscribing to Policy No. 20056 issued to Jeffrey Hartford M.D.
effective from June 1, 2004, to June 1, 2005, with a retroactive date of June 1, 2003, and NAS
Insurance Services, Inc. ("Underwriters") initially defended the action, but notified Dr. Hartford they
would no longer be defending or indemnifying the Harrisons' claim based on his violation of the
Special Endorsement. (CE 6, Ex. A, Ex. B.)
The Harrisons settled with the Dr. Hartford for a payment of $32,500, a stipulated judgment
against Dr. Hartford for $1,000,000 and an assignment of the allegedly negligent doctor's rights
against his insurer. (CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. I.) Because the doctor's insurance policy contained an
arbitration clause, the matter proceeded to arbitration. (R. Vol. I, p. 3.) The arbitrator found Dr.
Hartford violated the Special Endorsement by drinking, rendering coverage for the Harrisons' claims
void. (R. Vol. I, p. 198.) The Harrisons were awarded nothing by the arbitrator.

B.

Course of Proceedin~s.

Underwriters generally agrees with the Harrisons' course of proceedings but would add the
following:
The District Court's July 28,2009, Order was an appealable order pursuant to Idaho Code

$7-918. (R. Vol. I, pp. 216-219.) The Judgment subsequently filed contained no additional factual
or legal findings. (Id. at 220.) The Judgment was filed so Underwriters could seek an award of
attorney fees. (Id.) The time for filing a Notice of Appeal of the Order confirming the arbitration

award expired on September 8, 2008 I.A.R. 14(a). The Harrisons filed their Notice of Appeal on
September 11,2009. (R. Vol. 1, p. 222.) Thus, their appeal should be jurisdictionally barred by the
application of I.A.R. 14(a) & 17(e)(l)(B).

C.

Statement of Facts.

On November 15,2003, Dr. Hartford treated H. Ray Harrison at St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center for a severe sodium depletion brought on by Mr. Hamson's alcoholism. (R. Vol. I,
p. 78; CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. C, p. 4) The Harrisons sued Dr. Hartford, alleging he breached the applicable
standard of care by infbsing sodium back into Mr. Harrison's bloodstream too quickly. (CE 3, Ex.
A, Ex. C, p. 4.) According to the Harrisons, that sudden increase in sodium led to temporary
paralysis and long lasting neurological effects. (R. Vol. I, p. 78.) The Harrisons also alleged Dr.
Hartford breached the standard of care due in part to his drinking alcohol. (CE 6, Ex. A, Ex. A, p.
4-7.)
Dr. Hartford has a long history of substance abuse which was fully disclosed, documented
and discussed during the arbitration process. Dr. Hartford held a license to Practice Medicine and
Surgery in Idaho beginning on September 2, 1987. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 4.) Dr. Hartford has
engaged in excessivepersonal use of alcohol and controlled substances. (Id. at p. 4-2 1.) As a result,
Dr. Hartford entered into a Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine in I995 in order to
retain his medical license. (Id. at p. 7-8.) Dr. Hartford violated that Stipulation and Order by smoking
marijuana and drinking alcohol, an Order of Temporary Suspension was entered. (Id. at p. 8-9.) Dr.

Hartford then entered into an Amended Stipulation and Order in March of 1997. (Id. at p. 11.) In
August 1998, Physician Recovery Network advised the Board of Medicine Dr. Hartford had twice
tested positive for cannabinoids. (Id. at p. 12.) Based upon that, another Order of Temporary
Suspension was entered by the Board. (Id.) A Second Amended Stipulation and Disciplinary Order
was entered into between Dr. Hartford and the Board in January of 1999. ("Stipulation and Order")
(CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. D, p. JH 19- 26.) The Stipulation and Order required Dr. Hartford to "abstain
completely" from the use of alcohol. (Id. at p. JH 2 1.)
Underwriters provided medical malpractice insurance effective June 1,2003, to Dr. Hartford
that contained the following relevant provisions:

...

EXCLUSIONS

2.
Defense Only -No Payment of Damages
Underwriters will defend an Insured against a Claim otherwise covered by this Policy, which
includes allegations of:

...

C.
an occurrence while any Insured rendering direct patient treatment is under the
influence of alcohol, narcotics or hallucinogenic agents, or which results from other
substance abuse.

(CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. D, p. JH 37.)
ENDORSEMENT
STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AND DISCIPLINARY ORDER
In consideration of the premium charged the attached Stipulated Settlement and
Disciplinary Order, dated January 29, 1999, is hereby made part of the policy. Any failure
to adhere to the terms and conditions of the Order will be in violation of the policy and
will render the coverage void.

(Id. at pp. JH 18-26.) The Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order attached to the policy
required Dr. Hartford to completely abstain from the use of alcohol. (Id.)
On April 28,2004, the Harrisons filed a lawsuit against Dr. Hartford, and numerous other
providers, allegingnegligence. (R. Vol. 1, p. 79.) TheHarrisons moved to amend their claim to allege
a claim for punitive damages based on the contention Dr. Hartford had been providing treatment to
Mr. Harrison while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. (CE 6, Ex. A, Ex. B.) The
Harrisons, during the course of the litigation against Dr. Hartford, disclosed Mrs. Harrison would
provide testimony, "regarding Dr. Hartford treating Ray [Harrison] while under the influence of

. . ." (Id., Ex. A p. 3 (emphasis added).) The Harrisons also argued before the Idaho State
Board of Medicine's Prelitigation ScreeningPanel, "Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol on days he was
treating [H. Ray Harrison], that this impairment was impliedly a cause of his inadequate monitoring
of [H. Ray Harrison], and that St. Al's was negligent in hiring a physician with known alcohol
problems." (CE 3, Ex. A., Ex. C, p. 6.). Appellants have conveniently changedtheir allegations now
that they stand in the shoes of Dr. Hartford.
Underwriters learned that Dr. Hartford had been drinking alcohol when he failed aurine test
taken in December of 2003. (CE 6, Ex. B.) The urine test was requested after Mrs. Harrison
complained to Saint Alphonsus that Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol. (Id.) Dr. Hartford admitted he
had been using alcohol and entered a treatment program. (Id.) Underwriters informed Dr. Hartford
the Harrisons' claim was not covered due to his use of alcohol. (Id.)

Dr. Hartford eventually settled with the Harrisons for the sum of thirty two thousand dollars
($32,500.00) and an assignment of Dr. Hartford's potential claims against Underwriters. (CE 3, Ex.
A,, Ex. I.) On August 25, 2006, the Harrisons, as Dr. Hartford's assignees, filed suit against
Underwriters. (R. Vol. I, p. 6.)
Underwritersmoved to compel arbitrationunder the Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act ("IAA")
based on the arbitration clause in the insurance policy. (R. Vol. I, p. 164.) The insurance policy
mandated that "[ajny dispute. . . arising out of, in connection with or relating to this policy shall be
submitted to binding arbitration." (CE 3, Ex. A, Ex. D, p. JH 37.) The motion was granted by the
District Court on December 1, 2006. (R. Vol. I, pp. 3 & 167.) The parties agreed their arbitration
would be governed by the IAA and the rules of the American Arbitration Association would be used
to aid in resolving any procedural disputes. (CE 6, Ex. C.) On January 10, 2007, counsel for
Underwriters sent a letter to counsel for the Harrisons that contained the following:
We will proceed under the Idaho Arbitration Act and look to the American
~rbitration~ssociationrulesfor guidanceshould issuesarise during theproceedings.
If my understanding is incorrect as to our preliminary thoughts on arbitration, please
let me know.

(Id. emphasis added).) Plaintiffs did not object that the IAA would govern the dispute. The parties
each moved for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c). (CE 8 , 7 8-9.)
Appellant's counsel, Eric Rossman, alleged at some point after the Motion for Summary
Judgment had been fully submitted to the arbitrator for a decision, Mr. Rossman engaged in an ex
parte communication with the arbitrator about the case. (CE 4,9 10-1 1.)According to Rossman, the

arbitrator stated he was concerned about Dr. Hartford and had a friendor employee who had been
apatientof Dr. Hartford and knew of Dr. Hartford'spropensity for substance abuse and sub-standard
care for patients. (Id.) There is no evidence when the arbitrator became concerned or learned of this
information; although the reasonable inferences is that it came aRer the matter was fully submitted.
The arbitrator never indicated the information concerning Dr. Hartford was a surprise to him. As a
matter of fact, there was voluminous evidencepresented duing the arbitration proving Dr. Hartford
was an alcoholic, abused recreational drugs, had been to rehab on several occasions and admitted
to relapsing during 2003 by consuming alcohol several times a week from 2001 through January
2004. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. 1, pp. 1-18 (extensively detailing Dr. Hartford's abuse of alcohol and
drugs).) Dr. Hartford admitted that following his divorce in 2001, he drank three times a week. (Id.
at 20.) The Board of Medicine specifically found, "the fact that [Dr. Hartford] was drinking alcohol,
in violation of his Stipulations and Board Orders, is not in dispute" and he had been "actively
drinking at times during the fall and winter of 2003." (Id. at 19.) This information was presented to
the arbitrator on April 16,2007, several months before the conversation between Mr. Rossman and
the arbitrator in January 2008. (CE 3, Ex. B, p. 2.) Mr. Rossman did not tell Underwriters' counsel
of this conversation or make any objection to the arbitrator continuing to arbitrate the dispute.
On January 25,2008, the parties received the arbitrator's decision. (R. Vol. I, p. 199.) The
arbitrator found the insurance policy did not provide coverage for the Harrisons' claim because Dr.
Hartford drank alcohol in violation of the Stipulation and Order with the Board of Medicine and in

violation of the insurance policy's Special Endorsement. ( I d . at p. 198.) Thus, the arbitrator held
Underwriters was relieved of any further legal obligation to defend or indemnify the Hanisons'
claim. (Id.)
11. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Respondents feel the issues on appeal can be more clearly and completely stated as follows:
1.

Is theAppellantsl appeal ofthe order confining thearbitration awardjurisdictionallybarred
because they failed to file the notice of appeal within 42 days of that appealable order?

2.

Did the District Court err in confirming the arbitration award?
a.

Did the District Court err in holding that the Hanisons agreed to proceed under the
Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act?

b.

Did the District Court err in holding Appellants failed to establish the arbitrator
engaged in misconduct sufficient to vacate the arbitration award?

c.

Did the District Court err in finding the Appellants failed to establish the arbitrator
was biased?

d.

Does the record contain substantial evidence to support the District Court's finding
the Appellants waivedtheir bias claims by waitinguntil aRer the arbitrators' decision
to allege bias instead of objecting to the arbitrator when they had the opportunity to
do so?

e.

Did the Appellants establish the arbitratorcommitted a manifest disregard of the law?

3.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Underwriters?
111. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Underwriters requests that it be awarded attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code $8 9-714 and 12-121. Idaho Code 5 12-121
provides authority for an award of attorney fees when this Court finds that the appeal was "brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." (Id.)Idaho Code $ 12-121
provides a basis for an award of attorney fees to either the insured or the insurer.

Slaathaug v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705,711, 979 P.2d 107, 1 13 (1 999). A case is considered frivolously

appealed "if the law is well settled and the Appellants have made no substantial showing that the
District Court misapplied the law." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,377,973 P.2d 142,
148 (1999). The District Court correctly applied the law concerning the limited nature of review of
an arbitrator's decision. Because the Harrisons ask this Court to second guess the arbitrator's and
the District Court's factual and legal findings the Court should grant Underwriters' request for
attorney fees. The narrow scope of review of an arbitration award is well settled. The Harrisons
essentially argue the arbitrator made legal and factual errors, which are not reviewable. Thus, the
Harrisons' appeal is frivolous.
Idaho Code $ 7-914 (2004) This Court has held that because attorney fees in the district court
and on appeal are awardable under $7-914, there was no need to determine the applicability of $4 12120(3)or 12-121 to arbitration confirmationproceedings. Driver v. Syntheticlndus. Coup., 139Idaho

423,430,80 P.3d 1024,103 1 (2003). grants Courts the discretion to award attorney fees to "promote
the public policy of encouraging early payment of valid arbitration awards and the discouragement
of nonmeritorious protracted confirmation challenges." Driver v. Synthetic Indus., Inc., 139 Idaho
423,430,80 P.3d 1024,1031 (2003). "Attorney fees on appeal are awardable [pursuant to $7-9141
in the Court's discretion." Id.
If Underwriters prevails on appeal it is entitled to an award of attorney fees. See Deelstra v.
Hagler, 145 Idaho 922,924-25, 188 P.3d 864,866-67 (2008) (affirming district court's award of

attorney fees for pre and post-arbitration proceedings to prevailing party). Additionally, the
Harrisons challenge the arbitration award on grounds beyond the scopepermitted by either the Idaho
Uniform Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act as they essentially argue the arbitratormade
legal and factual errors which are not recognized bases for vacating arbitration awards. Thus,
attorney fees on appeal should be granted pursuant to I.C. 4 7-914. Driver, 139 Idaho at 430,80 P.
3d 1024.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

."When reviewing a district court's decision to vacate or modify an award of an arbitration

panel this Court employs virtually the same standard of review as that of the district wurt when
ruling on the petition." Moore v. Omnicare, 141 Idaho 809,814,118 P.3d 141, I46 (2005) (citing
Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Corp., 105 Idaho 36,42,665 P.2d 1046,1052 (1983)).

An arbitrator'srulingson questions of law and fact are binding, even where erroneous, unless
one of the enumerated statutory grounds is present. Reece v. U.S.Bankcorp Piper Jaffray, Inc., 139
Idaho 487,489,80 P.3d 1088,1091 (2003); Chicoine v. BignaN, 127 Idaho 225,227,899 P.2d 438,
440 (1995); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., I01 Idaho 557,562,617 P.2d 861, 866 (1980).
B.

Analvsis
1.

A~aeuants' Aaoeal of the Confirmation of the Arbitration Award is
Jurisdictionallv Barred Because Thev Failed to We a Timelv Notice of Aapeal

The Harrisons have appealed from issues determined by a final and appealableOrder entered
on JuIy 28,2008. (R. Vol. I, p. 216.) TheNotice of Appeal was due 42 days later, on September 8,
2008. I.A.R. 14(a). The Notice of Appeal was not filed until September 11,2008, three (3) days too
late. (R. Vol. I, p. 222.) The appeal should be dismissed as untimely.'
The Harrisons assert four issues on appeal. (R. Vol. 1, p. 223.) The Harrisons' designated
issues on appeal were adjudicated solely in the Order entered on July 28,2008. (R. Vol. I, p. 223.)
However, the Harrisons' appealed from the subsequent Judgment entered on August 11,2008. (Id.
at 222-23.) The Judgment does not adjudicate the issues presented by the Harrisons on appeal, except
for the award of attorney fees to Underwriters which was necessarily entered after the August 11,

-

2008, Judgment. (Id. at 220 23.)The Judgment merely directed Underwritersto file amemorandum
of costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code $7-914. (Id. at 223.)

'Underwriters previously moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely which was denied.
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The District Court confirmed the arbitration award in the July 28, 2008, Order, not the
August 11,2008 Judgment. (Compare R. Vol. I , pp. 216-2 19 with R. Vol. I, p. 220.) The Harrisons'
appeal from the District Court's Order is untimely. Their appeal from the subsequent Judgment does
not cure their untimeliness. Pursuant to I.A.R. 17(e)(l)(B) a final judgment does not include "final

... orders ...entered prior to judgment ...appealed from" for which the time for appeal has expired.
Following confirmation of an arbitration award, the purpose for entering a judgment is to
allow a party to enforce the arbitration award. A judgment also permits parties to request costs and
attorney fees. However, the judgment is not required for a party to appeal from an order or decree
that confirms an arbitration award. See Scaggs v. Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 114,117,
106 P.3d 440,443 (2005); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101,104 (1st Cir. 1995)
(discussing need to enter judgment to enforce confirmed arbitration award but holding no need to
enter judgment to appeal confirmation order).
This Court held when a district court entered a final appealable order entitled "Summary
Judgment for Defendants" and subsequently entered a "Final Judgment" referring to the Summary
Judgment for Defendants, the 42 day period within which to file an appeal from the grant of
summary judgment began with the entry of the appealable instrument entitled "Summary Judgment
for Defendants," not with the "Final Judgment." Large v. Mayes, 100 Idaho 450,452-53,600 P.2d
126,128-29 (1979) (dismissing appeal as untimely when party failed to file notice of appeal within
42 days of entry of immediately appealable judgment). In Large, the district court granted partial

summary judgment on April 12, 1978, and entered an appealablejudgment on April 19, 1978. Id.
The court subsequently entered an "Amendment to Summary Judgment for Defendants, as to
attorney fees only" on May 3 1,1978. Id. at 452,600 P.2d at 128. On June 23,1978, the wurt entered
a Final Judgment that mentioned the April 19, 1978, judgment. Id. This Court held the April 19,
1978, Summary Judgment for Defendants was a final appealable judgment as defined in I.A.R.
11(a)(2) and the time for appeal commenced from that date, despite the fact another two "judgments"
were subsequently entered. Id at 453,600 P.2d at 126. Consequently, the notice of appeal filed in
Large on June 28,1978, was not timely pursuant to I.A.R. 14 because it had not been filed within

42 days of the April 19, 1978, appealable judgment, which resolved the issues being appealed.
In the instant case, the District Court entered an appealable final order on July 28,2008. (R.,
Vol. I, p. 216.) The District Court entered a subsequent Judgment on August 11, 2008, without
incorporating or otherwise referencing the prior appealable order, and making no additional or
alternate findings. (R., Vol. I, p. 230.) The August 1 I, 2008, Judgment only dealt with issues
relevant to an award of costs and attorney fees and had no bearing on the confirmation of the
arbitration award. (Id.) Like the appellant in Large, the Harrisons were required to file their appeal
within 42 days of the appealable order that determined the issues they want to appeal. It makes no
difference that a final judgment, which also happens to be an appealablejudgmentas t o m i s s u e s ,
was subsequently filed. In this case the Harrisons filed a Notice of Appeal within 42 days of the
Judgment, but seek to appeal issues decided in an appealable order for which the time to appeal had

expired, the July 28,2008, Order. The Harrisons' appeal should be dismissed pursuant to I.A.R. 14
and I.A.R. 17(e)(l)(B). See Carr v. Carr, 116 Idaho 754, 757, 779 P.2d 429, 432 (Ct. App.
1989)(holdingfailure to file appeal within time limits prescribed by I.A.R. 14 is jurisdictional) .
Underwriters request the Court find the appeal of all issues except for the District Court's
award of attorney fees be jurisdictionally barred.
2.

The District Court Prooerlv Confirmed the Arbitration Award

Dr. Hartford's insurance policy with Underwriters contains two provisions dealing with the
use of alcohol. The first is a defense only exception concerning allegations that an insured was, at
the time the medical services were provided, under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Under this
exception, an insured would receive a defense but no indemnity. The arbitrator did not base his
decision on this exclusion, although he could have given Mrs. Harrison's allegations that Dr.
Hartford was under the influence of alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison.
The other provision was especially drafted for Dr. Hartford's policy due to his long history
of substance abuse. That Special Endorsement required Dr. Hartford to comply with& terms of the
Stipulation and Order. Failure to do so would "be in violation of the policy and will render the
coveras void." (CE, Ex. 2, Ex. B, Ex. D, p. JH 18 (emphasis added).) The Stipulation and Order
required Dr. Hartford to "abstain completely from the use of alcohol." (Id. at JH 21 .)
The arbitrator determined that Dr. Hartford had violated the terms of the Stipulation and
Order. The arbitrator relied, but only in part, on the findings of the Idaho Board of Medicine, which

held that, "the fact that [Dr. Hartford] was drinking alcohol, in violation of his Stipulations and
Board Orders, is not in disvute." (CE 2, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 19 (emphasis added).) This finding was
separate and apart from any finding that Dr. Hartford was intoxicated while he treated Mr.
Harrison.(R. Vol. I, p. 198.) The fact that Dr. Hartford violated the Stipulation and Order was
undisputed. The record contains numerous admissions by Dr. Hartford himself that he used alcohol
in violation of the terms of the Stipulation and Order. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A., p. 19-20.) The
consumption of=

alcohol at

=time was a violation of the Stipulationand Order. The Harrisons

concede that Dr. Hartford drank in violation of the Stipulation and Order. (See CE, Ex. 5, p. 15
(admission by the Harrisons Dr. Hartford drank at least five times in 2003).) Although the Harrisons
continue to rationalize the extent and timing of Dr. Hartford's drinking (especially when doing so
would be advantageous to their claim against Underwriters), they have not disputed the fact Dr.
Hartford violated the terms of the Stipulation and Order and therefore violated the insurancepolicy.
Because the undisputed evidence clearly demonstrated Dr. Hartford violated the policy, the
arbitrator was faced with the following pure legal issue:
The basic and overall issue in this arbitration proceeding is what was the effect of
violating the stipulated order, and was the failure to adhere to the terms and
provisions of the stipulated order a violation of the policy and thereby rendering the
policy void, or rendering a recision or cancellation of the entire policy.

(R. Vol. I, p. 197-98.) The arbitrator, succinctly and without relying on any disputed facts, answered
this legal issue as follows:

. . . the use of alcohol was in violation of the Disciplinary Order, and violated the

condition for coverage, and therefore excluded coverage for the Harrisons' claim. At
the time of Dr. Hartford's violation of the order and stipulation, he violated the
Special Endorsement and Underwriters was under no further obligation or duty to
defend and because of the violation there was no duty to indemnify.
(Id.,p. 198 emphasis added).)

Before the District Court and again before this Court, the Harrisons argued the arbitrator
made factual determinations on issues that were in contention.
The Harrisons apparently contend Dr. Hartford's violation of the Stipulated Order was
somehow a disputed fact. (CE 5, p. 13.) It was not. The Harrisons argue there was no proof Dr.
(AppellantsBrief, p.
Hartford had been drinking inNovember 2003, whenhe
5.) Whether Dr. Hartford was drinking when he treated Mr. Harrison is irrelevant to the Special
Endorsement which is violated by drinking alcohol at all, ever. Notably, Appellants acknowledged
Hartford admitted to drinking in 2003. (Id. ("Dr. Hartford testified he &drank in 2003, did not
drink at all in November of 2003, and, in fact, drank mavbe five times that vear.") (emphasis
added).) This limited admission is sufficient to trigger the Special Endorsement and no further
analysis is needed. Nevertheless, Dr. Hartford lied during the Board hearing, as demonstrated by his
later admissions. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A at p. 20 ("he admitted that, during all of his monitoring
contacts with the Board, he never auit using alcohol ....By his own admission, Dr. Hartforddrinking rermlarly again when he divorced his second wife in 2001 .") (emphasis added).)
The Harrisons attempt to confuse therecord by focusing on the issue ofwhether Dr. Hartford
was actually under the influence of alcohol at the very moment he was treating Mr. Harrison. The

Harrisons emphasized the Medical Board hearing officer held, "the record does not support a finding
Dr. Hartford was actively using alcohol while caring for patient HRH." (App. Brief, p. 6.) But this
is relevant only to the irrelevant defense only exclusion and has no bearing on the Special
Endorsement. Moreover, the Harrisons excised an important part of the Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order. The Harrisons conveniently failed to includethe following
within their quote of the hearing officer's proposed findings:
The record reflects Respondents' care and treatment provided to HRH is subject of
a pending pre-litigation screening panel proceeding. Respondent intends to
vigorously defend himself in that proceeding as against any claim that he may have
violated the community standard of care in treating HRH. Although Ms. Anderson's
[now Mrs. Harrison's] testimony is worrisome [continuing after the Harrisons'
ellipses] the record does not support a finding that Dr. Hartford was actively using
alcohol while caring for patient HRH or that he was impaired in his care and
treatment of the patient.
(CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 18-19.) The "worrisome" testimony from Ms. Anderson was her statement
Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol on three of the five occasions she met with him between November
15 through 23,2003. (Id. at p. 18.) The Harrisons conveniently gloss over their prior accusations
now that they stand in the shoes of the admitted alcoholic.
Whether or not Dr. Hartford was actually drinking while treating H. Ray Harrison is
irrelevant and immaterial to whether he violated the policy by using alcohol at any time and is only
relevant to the defense only exclusion. The Harrisons cling to the position the arbitrator erroneously
determined Dr. Hartford was providing medical care while under the influence. (App. Brief, p. 27-

29.) First, that would be a factual finding which cannot be reviewed by this Court. Second, the

Hamsons conveniently overlook the undisputed evidence that Dr. Hartford drank on a regular basis
in 2003, violating the Stipulation and Order and rendering coverage void. So, the arbitrator's
statements concerningthe findings of the Idaho Board of Medicine were not legally dispositive facts.
Whether or not Dr. Hartford was sober (and just smelled of alcohol) when treating Ray Harrison
makes no difference. The arbitrator made his legal ruling based on the undisputed fact Dr. Hartford
violated the Stipulation and Order. That factual finding cannot be reversed.
The arbitrator was faced with a very simple case. An alcoholic doctor was offered medical
malpractice insurance with a Special Endorsement stating coveraee would be void if the doctor
drank any alcohol during the time the policy was in force. Dr. Hartford admitted he breached the
endorsement by failing to abstain from alcohol. The arbitrator undisputedly held the legal
consequence of that breach was to exclude coverage for the Harrisons' claim. The arbitrator's
decision is both legally and procedurally supportable, was properly confirmed by the District Court,
and is not subject to reversal on appeal.

a.

T
Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act.

v

The Harrisons argue that the District Court should havereviewed the arbitration award under
the FAA standards. (App. Brief, p. 10- 15.) The Harrisons contend the FAA applies because the
matter being arbitrated involved interstate commerce. (Id.,p. IS.) However, the Harrisons agreed

that the matter would be decided pursuant to the IAA. The FAA was never discussed nor
contemplated by the parties during the arbitration process. The first time the FAA became an issue
was when the Hamsons learned that the FAA gave them an additional ground for vacating the award
manifest disregard.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that there is an exception to the application of the
mles of the FAA to transactions involving interstate commerce. In Moore v. Omnicare, the Court
held that "where parties have expressly agreed that Idaho law will govern arbitration, the IAA, not
the FAA, applies as the substantive law in arbitration." 141 Idaho at 814,118 P.3d at 147; see ako
Sovak v. Chugai, 280 F.3d 1266,1269 (9th Cir. 2002) (presumption that the FAA, and not state law,
supplies the rules for arbitration is overcome by indication from parties that state law applies). The
Harrisons seek to abandon the IAA in favor of the FAA because the FAA offers an avenue for relief
not available under IAA. Idaho, when consideringwhether to confirm an arbitration award under the
IAA, does not recognize a "manifest disregard" standard of review of an arbitrator's decision.
However, even if that standard did apply, the Harrisons failed to establish before the District Court
and this Court they are entitled to relief under that standard.
The parties agreed the dispute would be governed by the IAA, the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, and to a limited extent, the rules ofthe American Arbitration Association. (CE 6, Ex. C.)
The parties clearly intended the IAA would govern the arbitration and therefore any dispute
following the arbitration decision. Idaho Code 57-901 states: "A written agreement to submit any

existing controversy to arbitration a a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable& irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." (emphasis added) The
Harrisons and Underwriters agreed to proceed under the IAA, not the FAA and the Harrisons could
not unilaterally revoke their agreement once it became advantageous to do so.
The Harrisons' attorney avers that he never agreed to proceed under the IAA, either expressly
or otherwise. (CE 8, 7 4) However, the Harrisons' attorney does not challenge the fact that he
received a letter from Underwriters' counsel stating unless the Harrisons made an objection, the
dispute would be governed by the IAA. (CE 6, Ex. C) A&er receiving this letter, the Harrisons
counsel had reason to believe silence on the subject would be taken as assent to proceeding under
the IAA. The letter requested action by the Harrisons if they disagreed with the expressed intention
to proceed under the IAA. (Id.) Underwriters' counsel clearly manifested silence would be
understood as an acceptance of the agreement. The Harrisons remained silent.
When a party has reason to know that its assent would be manifested by silence and fails to
object, the terms of the agreement are deemed to be accepted . Eimco Div., Envirotech Gorp. v.
United Pacific Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 762,764,710 P. 2d 672,674 (Ct. App. 1985). As inEimco, the
Harrisons had reason to know that their agreement to proceed under the IAA would be manifested
by silence and inaction. They were told as much by Underwriters. Like in Eimco, there was no
evidence the Harrisons intended to reject the offer to proceed under the IAA. The Harrisons only

objected to proceeding under the IAA after the arbitration decision was handed down and the
Hanisons, faced with the narrow avenues for relief from an arbitration award, sought additional
avenues to vacate the award. But, at that point the arbitration had already proceeded under the IAA.
Regardless, as will be demonstrated below, the Harrisons can not prevail even under the FAA.
b.

Avoelfants have failed to establish anv mounds to vacate the arbitration
award under the IAA or FAA.

Arbitrators are the final judges of law and fact. Bingham County Comm'n. at 42,665 P.2d
at 1052. A court is precluded from substituting its interpretation of the submitted contract for that
of the arbitrator. Hecla Min. Co., 101 Idaho at 566,617 P.2d at 870 (1980). TheHecla court stated:
"The courts are precluded from considering factual or legal issues which are by
voluntary agreement made the subject of arbitration. Judicial intrusion is restricted
to extraordinary situations indicating abuse of arbitral power or exercise of power
beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator."
Id., at 563,617 P.2d at 867 (citations omitted). The Hecla court further noted:
"It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the
arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from
his."
Id., at 562,617 P.2d at 866 (citation and quotation omitted). "Even though a reviewing court might

consider some of the arbitrator's rulings on questions of law to be error, the arbitrator's decision is
nevertheless binding on a court." Bingham County Comm 'n., 105Idaho at 41 n.7,665 P.2d at 1051.
While a court of law or one of the parties to the agreement might interpret the contract differently,
such a variance in interpretation is not grounds for reversing the arbitrator's award.

Western

Const., Inc. v. Oregon-SouthernIdaho, Etc., 101 Idaho 145, 148,609 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1980). The

arbitrator's rulings on the law or findings of fact are essentially unassailable on appellate review.
The Harrisons argue the arbitration award should be vacated because: (1) the arbitrator
engaged in misconduct by not disclosing apotential bias; (2) the arbitrator exceeded his powers by
making a factual finding during a summaryjudgment proceeding; and (3) the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law. (App. Brief, p. 16 & 26.) The District Court held the Harrisons failed to
sufficiently establish reasons for vacating the arbitration award. (R. Vol. I, p. 216 - 18.)
(1)

The Harrisons Presented No Evidence the Arbitrator Engaged in Any
Misconduct and Have Failed to DemonstrateEvident Partiality on the
Part of the Arbitrator

The Harrisons argue that the arbitrator engaged in misconduct by not disclosing a potential
bias. (App. Brief, p. 16.) The Harrisons confuse "misconduct" with evident partiality. The failure
to disclose a conflict could be grounds for vacation under the evident partiality prong of the IAA or
the FAA. However, the Harrisons have provided no evidence the arbitrator engaged in any
misconduct. The Hanisons argue the District Court erred in holding the Harrisons waived any claim
of misconduct. (App. Brief, p. 16.) The District Court did not consider whether the arbitrator
engaged in any misconduct because the issue was not presented by the Harrisons (R. Vol. I, p. 216

-

2 18) and can not be reviewed now since it would be an issue raised for the first time on appeal. The
Appellant has the burden to overcome a presumption that the arbitration award is valid. Reece, 139
Idaho at 492,80 P.3d at 1003 (citingMutual Fire, Marine d; Ins. Co. v. NoradReinsurance Co. Ltd.,

868 F.2d 52,57 (3rd Cir. 1989).). Providing

evidenceof misconduct does not satisfy this burden.

The Harrisons base their attack upon the arbitrator's integrity on his alleged disclosure to
their attorney that a friend or employee of the arbitrator knew about Dr. Hartford's drinking problem
and sub-standard care of patients. (App. Brief, p. 17.) That disclosure does not establish partiality,
evident or otherwise. The Harrisons have never provided any evidence the arbitrator had any
potential bias towards the Harrisons and only argue the arbitrator was biased against Dr. Hartford.
(App. Brief, p. 17) (arguing arbitrator "had an inherent bias against Dr. Hartford.").) Dr. Hartford
was not a party to the arbitration nor this litigation.
TheHarrisonshavetheburdenofestablishing the existenceofany evident partiality. Because
both arbitration acts contain language pertaining to "evident partiality," the Idaho Supreme Court
has recognized that the IAA is substantially similar to the FAA on that issue. Reece, 139 Idaho at
488, 80 P.3d at 1089. Therefore, the case law from federal circuits interpreting the contours of
"evident partiality" standard are, although not binding, persuasive. Federal courts have identifiedtwo
different types of evident partiality: actual bias and non-disclosure. Woods v. Saturn Distribution
Corp., 78 F.3d 424,427 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Harrisons have confused and merged the two types of evident partiality, but in the end
have failed to establish either. First, the Harrisons have admitted the arbitrator voluntarily disclosed
the information. But they have not established-

the arbitrator had the discussion with the friend

or employee. There is no evidence the arbitrator had this conversation before he was selected as an

arbitrator. In fact, areasonable inference is that the arbitrator disclosed the conversation shortly after
he had it. Thus, the Hanisons have not established any information was not properly disclosed
during selection of the arbitrator. Second, the Hanisons have not established the arbitrator's
knowledge of this information affected on the resolution of the matter. They have provided no
evidence of any actual (evident) bias. Finally, the Hanisons waived these arguments by failing to
object to the arbitrator continuing to work on the case before they received an adverse decision.
(a)

The Harrisons Have Not Demonstrated Evident Partialitv bv NonDisclosure.

The Hanisons seek to vacate the arbitrationdecision because the arbitrator-

to their

counsel, Eric Rossman, he had heard f?om a third party that Dr. Hartford had a drinking problem.
So, the Harrisons admit there was a disclosure and therefore non-disclosure cannot be grounds for
vacating the arbitration award.
The Harrisons' argument this informationshould have been disclosed sooner is not supported
by the record because the Hanisons have not established when the arbitrator learned this
information. As the record stands, the arbitrator apparently disclosed it immediately upon receiving
the information. There is no evidence demonstrating the arbitrator had this information during the
selection process or at any other critical time.
Regardless, the information wasn't extraneous, surprising, new or even outside the
permissible record. Dr. Hartford's drinking and substance abuse was well documented within the
arbitration. Dr. Hartford himself admitted he was drinking on a regular basis during the time period

from his divorce in 2001 until at least December of 2003, when he again tested positive for alcohol
in his system. The mere fact a third person allegedly told the arbitrator he or she knew Dr. Hartford
had substance abuse problems is merely cumulative and could not reasonably create any partiality
against Dr. Hartford and certainly doesn't create bias against the Harrisons. Additionally, only "non
trivial" biases and conflicts warrant vacation of an arbitration award See New Regency Productions,

Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films,Inc., 501 F. 3d 1101,1110 ("vacatur is only appropriate if the conflict
left undisclosed was real ... and not trivial.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). The fact the
arbitrator heard something about Dr. Hartford's substance abuse from an extrajudicial source is
trivial considering the voluminous evidence properly before the arbitrator demonstrating Dr.
Hartford's extensive substance abuse problems. Because the alleged conversation was disclosed and
the information could not reasonably createa bias or partiality, the Harrisons have failed to meet the
heavy burden of establishing the arbitration award should be vacated.
The Harrisons argue had they known the arbitrator knew Dr. Hartford was an alcoholic, the
Harrisons would not have chosen him. The Harrisons' contention they would have asked the
arbitrator to recuse himself because of this alleged biaq rings hollow in light of the Harrisons'
counsel's proposal to use a replacement arbitrator in this matter and failure to object to the arbitrator
when they had the chance: (CE 6, Ex. D.)

4Thechosen arbitrator became gravely ill and had to postpone his resolution of the matter.
Plaintiffs then sought a replacement arbitrator. However, the arbitrator regained his health and a
replacement was ultimately unnecessary.

The Harrisons' suggested replacement was a partner to the attorney who represented Dr.
Hartford in the underlyingproceedings before the State Board of Medicine concerning Dr. Hartford's
violations of the terms of his licensure (i.e. drinking and using abusive substances). (CE 3, Ex. B,
Aff., Ex. A, (Proposed Findings of Fact) p. 1.)Therecorddoes not demonstrate the Harrisons would
have forced the arbitratorto recuse himself based on the fact he had vague, second hand knowledge
Dr. Hartford had a "propensity for substance abuse." (CE 4,7 11.) They suggested replacing him
with a person who had actual prior knowledge of Dr. Hartford's extensive history of drug and
alcohol abuse. In any event, the Harrisons had ample opportunity to object to the selected arbitrator
after learning of the alleged bias and failed to do so, as will be more fully disclosed below.

(b)

The Harrisons Have Not Demonstrated the Arbitrator Was Actually

w.

Simply stated, the issue is whether or not the arbitrator displayed any
not whether there was a someg-1

(evident) bias,

for partiality. Schmik v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043,1047 (9th Cir.

1994) ("in an actual bias determination, the integrity of the arbitrators' decision is directly at issue.
That a reasonable impression of partiality is present does

mean the arbitration award was the

product of impropriety.") (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit requires a high standard for allegations of actual bias by an
arbitrator under the FAA: "The appearance of impropriety, standing alone, is
insufficient to establish evident partiality in actual bias cases, because a reasonable
impression of partiality does not necessarily mean that the arbitration award was the
product of impropriety." Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424,427 (9th
Cir.1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To establish an arbitrator's
"actual bias," therefore, "the party alleging evident partiality ... must establish
specific facts which indicate improper motives." Ibid.

Carmack v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), 521 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The
Narrisons have not shown the arbitratorwas actuallv biased against them. The Harrisons' arguments
the arbitrator had improper motives is baseless and wholly unsupported by the record.
Although a judge (or arbitrator) could be biased by discovering extrajudicial facts, in order
for such bias to be disqualifyingthe alleged bias, "must stem from an extrajudicial source &result
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the iudee learned from his varticivation

i n . " Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120Idaho 27,29,813 P.2d 366,368 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis
added) (citation and quotation omitted). The Idaho Court of Appeals held a mere conversation
outside the judicial proceedings, is not in and of itself evidence of bias. Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho
43 1,436,860 P. 2d 634,639 (Ct. App. 1993). In Smith, Vernon Smith alleged the Magistrate should
have recused himself from the case after he had a conversation with a non-party about the case. 124
Idaho at 434-35,860 P.2d 634-36. The Magistrate denied therequest based on his determinationthat
he could be impartial. The Court of Appeals, finding no evidence of any &J&,

bias, affirmed the

Magistrate's discretionary decision to deny the motion for recusal. (Id.)
Here, the Narrisons allege the arbitrator was biased by information he learned outside the
arbitration proceedings. (CE 5, p. 3.) But the information learned by the arbitrator was already
contained within the record. The Hamisons themselves submitted the materials containing Dr.
Hartford's admissions he had been drinking both prior to and after the time frame he was treating
Mr. Harrison. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 19-20.) The evidence the Harrisons submitted contained Mrs.

Harrison's own testimony she encountered Dr. Hartford at the hospital while he was treating Mr.
Harrison and Dr. Hartford smelled of alcohol. (Id.)
The Harrisons' only apparent basis for actual bias against them is the adverse ruling. "A
disqualifying prejudice cannot be deduced from adverse rulings by a judge, whether they are right
or wrong." Desfosses, 120 Idaho at 30,813 P.2d at 369 (citation omitted). "[S]uspicion, surmise,
speculation, rationalization, conjecture, innuendo, and statements ofmere conclusions... may not be
substituted for a statement of facts" establishing actual bias. Id. (citation omitted). The Harrisons'
mere suspicion and speculation of bias by the arbitrator based on receiving an adverse ruling fails
to establish any actual bias on the part of the arbitrator.
.(c)- h T

"Where a party to an arbitration has constructive knowledge of a potential conflict but fails
to timely object" then the objection is waived Fidelity Federal Bank v. Durga Ma Coup.,386 F.3d
1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 2004). By failing to timely object to the alleged appearance of partiality, the
objection is waived. Id. at 1311. The same is true for objections based on allegations of actual bias.
See, e.g., UnionNo. 420 v. Kinney Air Conditioning Co.,756 F.2d 742,740 (9th Cir. 1985)(holding

failure to object to arbitrators with known conflicts waived if not timely made); Kodiak Oil Field
Haulers, Inc. v. Teamsters Union Local 959,611 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).

Here, the arbitrator disclosed the information that the Harrisons' allege made him biased two
to three

before the Arbitration Decision (App. Brief, p. 19 ("The Arbitrator's decision was

received on January 25, 2008, approximately two to three weeks after the disclosure.").) Despite
having ample notice of the alleged bias, the Hanisons did not raise any objection until nearly three
months after the Arbitration Decision. When an arbitrator "is challenged for evident partiality, the
issue is deemed waived unIess the objecting party raised it to the arbitration panel." Delta Mine
Holding Co, v. AFC Coal Properties, Inc., 280 F. 3d 815,821 (8th Cir. 2001). The reasons for such

a rule are obvious. "An interpretation under which a party could wait until it lost and then
successfully raise the objection of partiality should be avoided." Id. (citation omitted).
Because their objection wasnot made prior to the arbitrator's decision, and the Harrisons had
ample opporhmity to raise any objections, the District Court held the Hanisons waived their
obligation. (TR, Vol. I, p. 216 - 218) The District Court's finding the Hanisons waived their bias
argument was supported by substantial and competent evidence and should be affirmed.
(2)

The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Powers.

The Hanisons argue that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by ignoring summaryjudgment
rules and deciding factual issues on disputed evidence. (App. Brief, p. 22.) The Idaho SupremeCourt
has "construed the phrase exceeded his powers in

8 7-912(a)(3) to mean that the arbitrator

considered an issue not submitted to him by the parties, or exceeded the bounds of the contract
between theparties." Chicoine, 127 Idaho at 227,899 P.2d at 440 (citations andinternal quotations
omitted). Exceeding one'spowers, in the arbitrationcontext, does not mean making a legal or factual
error. Absent express limitation by the parties, the resulting gant of authority to an arbitrator is very

broad. Hecla at 564,617 P.2d at 868.
The contract clearly grants the arbitrator the power to resolve all claims, both legal and
factual, between the parties. The arbitration clause reads that, "[ajny dispute between the Insured
and Underwriters arising out of, in connection with or relating to this policy shall be submitted to
arbitration. . ." (CE 4, Ex. D, p. JH 37 (emphasis added)). The Harrisons, as assignees of the
contract, stand in the shoes of the assignor. Bldg. Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 1 14 Idaho 640,644,
759 P.2d 931,935 (1988). Consequently, the Harrisons were obligated to submit all issues of law
and fact to binding arbitration.
The Harrisons' contention the arbitrator exceeded his powers is devoid of merit because he
did not consider

not submitted to him. Deciding issues on disputed facts is at most a legal

error and does not rise to the level of exceeding one's powers. In any event, as amply demonstrated
above, there was no dispute over the dispositive fact Dr. Hartford drank in violation of the Idaho
Board of Medicine's Stipulation and Order and therefore in violation of his insurance contract. So,
the only issue the arbitrator really had to decide was the legal implications of Dr. Hartford's violation
of the Special Endorsement.
The Harrisons argue the arbitrator did not have the authority to determine factuaI matters
when rendering a decision on the cross motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. (App.
Brief, p. 22.) However, the arbitrator did follow the rules of summaryjudgment. Rule 56(c) provides
"an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but . . .

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." At arbitration,
the Harrisons failed to establish a genuine issue of materid fact.' The issue, as properly framed by
the arbitrator, was what was theeffect of Dr. Hartford's undisputed violation of the Stipulated Order,
namely did the violation void coverage for the Harrisons' claim. There were no disputed material
facts relating to this legal issue. Dr. Hartford admitted he drank aRer the Stipulated Order was in

affect. The Stipulated Order required total abstinence from alcohol. All that remained was a pure
legal question. Based on those undisputed facts, the arbitrator ruled the violation of the Stipulated
Order had the legal effect of voiding coverage of the Harrisons' claims based on the terms of the
policy. This legal ruling is not reviewable on appeal and does not rise to the level of exceeding the
arbitrator's power since this was the precise legal issue submitted by both parties on summary
judgment.
The Harrisons repeatedly confuse the issue by arguing the Idaho State Board of Medicine
never held Dr. Hartford had been using alcohol at the time he was treating Mr. Harrison. (App. Brief
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p. 22 25.) This straw man argument only concerns the defense-only exclusion which the arbitrator
did not use as the basis for his decision. The only fact relevant to the arbitrator's decision was the

f& Dr. Hartford drank in 2003 and triggered the Special Endorsement. The State Board&!

find Dr.

Hartford violated the Stipulated Disciplinary Order prohibiting him from imbibing in any alcohol

'Deciding whether Dr. Hartford was under the influence when he was treating Mr.
Harrison is not material to the Special Endorsement which requires only that Dr. Hartford
consumed alcohol at any time. See below.

whatsoever. (CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A., p. 19.) The Hamsons never disputed Dr. Hartford admitted
drinking three days a week from at least 2001 (when he and his wife divorced) until at least January
2004 (when he admitted himself into a substance abuse program located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi
for several months). (Id. at 19-20.) No one disputes Dr. Hartford tested positive for alcohol use in
December 2003. (Id. at 19.) No one disputes the State Medical Board found Dr. Hartford "was
actively drinking at times during the fall and winter of 2003" and "the fact that [Dr. Hartford] was
drinking alcohol, in violation ofhis Stipulations and Board Orders, is not in dispute."(Id. (emphasis
added).) Mrs. Harrison testified she smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford's person three out of the five
times she met with him in November of 2003 to discuss her husband's condition. (Id.)The Harrisons
argue Mrs. Harrison testified it "wasn't like [Dr. Hartford] had just taken a drink, but like he had
been drinking prior to, possibly the night before." (App. Brief, p. 25.) The record clearly
demonstrates the arbitrator decided the cross motions for summaryjudgment on an undisputed fact
that Dr. Hartford drank alcohol in violation of the Stipulated Order.
Moreover, because the arbitrator was both the finder of fact and law, the Harrisons were not
entitled to any reasonable inferences from undisputed facts. "When an action will be tried before the
court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing
a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to amve at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho
434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

The arbitrator's reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts after "a very complete and
detailed examination of the entire record on several occasions" are not in violation of I.R.C.P. 56(c).
(R. Vol. I, p. 197.) The Harrisons never disputed the fact Dr. Hartford had violated the terms of the
Stipulated Order.6The arbitrator was free to infer from the evidence that Dr. Hartford did in fact
violate the terms of his policy. The arbitrator, viewing the facts in the most reasonable light rather
than in the light most favorable to the Harrisons, concluded the evidence supported the finding Dr.
Hartford had been drinking. The arbitrator did not exceed his powers, and his Arbitration Decision
was properly confirmed.
4.

c
the Law.

The Harrisons argue that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. (App. Brief, p. 27.)
However, this Court has held the manifest disregard standard is not recognized under the IAA.
Moore at 819,118 P.3d at 151. Because the parties agreed the IAA would apply, the Harrisons have

moved for relief under a legal theory not recognized by Idaho and any attempt to vacate the
arbitrator's decision under the manifest disregard standard fails.
To the extent this Court tinds the dispute is governed by the FAA and not the IAA or finds
the manifest disregard standard applies, the Harrisons have failed to establish a manifest disregard
of the law. The Harrisons try to disguise under a manifest disregard mbric their contention the

61n fact, the Harrisons sought punitive damages in the related malpractice lawsuit based
on the allegation that Dr. Hartford's alcoholism was a proximate cause of the medical
malpractice. (CE 6, Ex. A, p. 4-7.)

arbitrator made a legal error (which he did not) by making an unauthorized factual determination
(which he did not).
The manifest disregard exception requires "something beyond and different from a
mete error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand and apply
S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals ~ t d . ,
the law." San Martine Comgania De ~aveg-acion,
293 F.2d 796,801 (9th Cir.1961). Accordingly, we may not reverse an arbitration
award even in the face of an erroneous interpretation of the law. See A. G. Edwards
v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.1992).
Collins v. D.R. Norton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874,879-880 (9th Cir. 2007). "This non-statutory ground is
not an excuse for the court to weigh the 'degree of error' of law, if any, and thereby thwart the rule
of limited review. Rather, the arbitrator must have manifested an infidelity to his obligation to

honestly interpret the contract within the context of the issues submitted to him. . . . " Hecla
at 566, 617 P.2d at 870. (emphasis added) Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate the arbitrator did
more than commit an "error or misunderstanding with respect to the law." Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F. 2d 930,933 (2nd Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit explained:
Judicial inquiry under the "manifest disregard" standard is therefore extremely
limited. The governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be
well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. We are not at liberty to set aside an
arbitration panel's award because of an arguabledifference regarding the meaning or
applicability of laws urged upon it.
Id. Courts must "defer to such legal conclusions and interpretations even though the arbitrator has
misinterpreted the law." George Day Constr. Co, v. CarpentersLocal 354,722 F.2d 1471,1477 (9th
Cir. 1984). When two plausible interpretations by an arbitrator exist, the arbitrator's choice ofone
ought to be honored even if the reviewing court would have chosen the other. IAMLocal389 v. San

Diego Marine Constr, Corp., 620 F.2d 736,738-39 (9th Cir. 1980). The Harrisonsmust demonstrate
the arbitrator's legal holding was "completely irrational" and constituted an intentional disregard of
the law. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056,1060 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Harrisons allege the arbitratormanifestly disregarded the law by: (1) ignoring summary
judgment rules; (2) making a factual finding irreconcilable with the undisputed facts; (3) ignoring
the taw concerninginterpretationof insurancecontracts; and (4) ignoring established lamncerning
the effect of failing to tender back premiums after rescission of a policy. (App. Brief, p. 26.)
a.

The Arbitrator Did Not ManifestlvDisregard theRules of Summarv Judment Found
in the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure."

As discussed above, the arbitrator made a legal decision based on undisputed and admitted
facts, which is permitted under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, even on summary judgment.
Even if the arbitrator made an error of law (which Underwriters dispute), that error does not rise to
the level of a manifest disregard of the law.
b.

a

The Harrisons claim that the arbitration award is legally irreconcilable with the undisputed
facts. (App. Brief, p. 27.) The arbitrator's decision Underwritershad no duty to indemnify or defend
Dr. Hartford against the Harrisons' medical malpractice claims can be easily reconciled with the
undisputed facts of the case. By violating the Stipulation and Order, Dr. Hartford triggered the
7Thefact the Harrisons argue that the federal standard of manifest disregard should be
applied is undercut by the contention the law manifestly disregarded is Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c).
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application of the Special Endorsement contained in his policy, which in turn rendered "coverage
void" for the Harrisons' claim as stated in the insurance contract. The Harrisons real problem with
the arbitrator's decision is that the Harrisons disagree with the arbitrator's application of the Special
Endorsement. The arbitrator's resolution of that legal question is

areviewable under the IAA (or

the FAA).
The Harrisons argue factual errors that rise to a manifest disregard of legally dispositive facts
can be grounds for vacating awards under the FAA.' (App. Brief, p. 27-28.) A fact is legally
dispositive if it forms the foundation for a legal ruling. The arbitrator's alleged erroneous factual
finding (that the Board of Medicine found Dr. Hartfordhad been drinking while providing treatment
to Mr. Harrison) is not a legally dispositive fact. That finding was dicta. That finding played no part
in the basis for the arbitrator's ultimate holding. The fact Dr. Hartford violated the Stipulated Order
by consuming alcohol after the Stipulated Order and

he treated Mr. Harrison cannot be

disputed and this finding was the basis for the arbitrator's decision.
The Harrisons cherry pick the Board of Medicine hearing officers' Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order and attempt to gloss over the fact Dr. Hartford
admitted to violating the terms of the Stipulated Order. (See App. Brief, p. 29 ('There is simply no
evidence in the record demonstrating that Dr. Hartford ever admitted to using alcohol while he was
treating Mr. Harrison or that he was under the influence of alcohol while treating Mr. Harrison.")
Respondents contend the IAA and not the FAA applies and only respond to the
manifest disregard of fact arguments in the event the Court finds the FAA does indeed apply.
-36-

The Harrisons overlook the hearing officers' finding Dr. Hartford, when confronted with the results
of a positive alcohol test from December 15, 2003, "first denied using alcohol. However, he later
recanted his denial and admitted to John Southworth that he had been drinking again for some time."
(CE 3, Ex. B, Ex. A, p. 19.) The hearing officer also noted there was no scientific evidence of Dr.

Hartford's use of alcohol during the time he treated Mr. Harrison because there was no test taken
during that time frame. (Id. (noting the complaint about Dr. Hartford's use of alcohol and smelling
of alcohol made to St. Alphonsus by Julie Harrison (then Anderson) '%as received too late to obtain
laboratory confirmation of Dr. Hartford's alcohol status.").)
Dr. Hartford treated Mr. Harrison from November 15,2003, through November 22,2003,
or, in the late fall, early winter of 2003. The hearing officer found it was undisputed Dr. Hartford was
drinking in the fall and winter of2003. So, logically, the hearing officer determined Dr. Hartford was
violating his Stipulation and Board orders during the time frame he treated Mr. Harrison (albeit the
hearing officer could not conclusively find Dr. Hartford was under the influence of alcohol at the
very moment he treated Mr. Harrison).
Breaching the Stipulation and Order was a violation of the Special Endorsement of Dr.
Hartford's medical malpractice policy. The fact no one witnessed Dr. Hartford drink a beer in the
hospital break room before strolling out to treat Mr. Harrison does not change the fact Dr. Hartford
breached the terms of the insurance policy. The only real question for the arbitrator was the legal
impact of that breach.
The arbitrator's legal holding, based on undisputed facts, did not rise to the level of manifest
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disregard. It was manifestly correct. Even if this Court believes the decision was legally incorrect,
that does not merit vacating the award. To warrant vacation, the arbitrator's decision must
demonstrate an intentional infidelity to the law. The Harrisons fail to demonstrate or even argueany
more than the potential the arbitrator made an unreviewable error of law. The arbitrator's decision
was properly confirmed by the District Court.
c.

Arbitrator Did Not Manifestlv Disregard Idaho Law Concerning Internretation of
Insurance Policv Lanma~e

The Arbitrator found Dr. Hartford's violation of the Special Endorsement rendered coverage
for the Harrisons' claims against Dr. Hartford void, but did not mean amount to a recession of the
entire policy. (R. Vol. 1, p. 198.)The Hanisons argue the arbitrator should have determined whether
the policy language contained in the Special Endorsement was "unambiguousas to whether violation
rendered coverage void" but the arbitrator "made no such determination in his decision." (App.
Brief, p. 33 (emphasis added).) The Harrisons mistakenly believe the arbitrator was required to
provide a written explanation of the ultimate holding. Neither the IAA nor the FAA require an
arbitrator to provide a detailed explanation concerning the conclusions of fact or law. It is clear,
however, that the arbitrator found no ambiguity in the contract language.
The IAA requires only that "[tlhe &be in writing and signed by the arbitratorsjoining
in the award." I.C.

5 7-908(a). (emphasis added) The IAA does not require written findings of fact

or conclusions of law. Hecla, 101 Idaho at 557, n.l, 617 P.2d at 861. The Idaho Court of Appeals
has stated Idaho Courts, "prefer that decision-makersprovide an explanation of the reasoning behind

a decision, to the parties in conflict. However, in light of the statutorily limited review and the strong
presumption of validity accorded any result, we cannot say that arbitrators are required as a matter
of law to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law." Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667,
671,747 P.2d 76,80 (Ct. App. 1987).
Federal law concerning this subject is in tune with Idaho law. "[AJrbitrators are not required
to state the reasons for their decisions....The rule that arbitrators need not state their reasons
presumes the arbitrators took a permissible route to the award where one exists." A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (1 992) (citations omitted).
The arbitrator impliedly found the Special Endorsement to be unambiguous in holding it
rendered coverage void for the Harrisons' claims against Dr. Hartford. The arbitrator quoted the
Special Endorsement in his decision and thus clearly considered the language of the insurancepolicy.
(R. Vol. I., p. 196.) By determining the legal effect of the Special Endorsement, the arbitrator
presumably found the language unambiguous. That finding is not reviewable by this Court. The
Harrisons erroneously argue the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is subject to de
novo review. (App. Brief, p. 30.) That is not the case when this Court reviews arbitration decisions.
An arbitrator's legal conclusions are not reviewable. Under both Idaho and federa1 law, this Court
is bound to presume the arbitrator considered the legal issues even though there was no detailed
explanation of the reasoning behind the decision.

d.

Arbitrator Did Not En in Finding No Premiums Needed to be Returned Because the
Insurance Policv was Not Rescinded.

Plaintiffs' contention that the arbitrator committed a manifest disregard of law by failing to
properly distinguish Idaho case law concerning tendering premiwns after rescission of insurance

-

contracts does not meet the stringent manifest disregard standard. (App. Brief, p. 33 35.) Notably,
the arbitrator determined that the contract had

been rescinded, therefore no premiums needed to

be tendered. (R. Vol. 1, p. 198.) The arbitrator's legal conclusion the policy was not rescinded is not
reviewable. The decision was not the product of an intentional disregard of the governing standards.
Because the policy was not rescinded, the law concerning tendering back premiums is irrelevant.

5.
Proceedis
- Below

Idaho Code $7-914 reads that "Costs of the application and of the proceedings subsequent
thereto, and disbursements

be awarded by the Court." (emphasis added). Idaho Code $7-914

does not require courts to find arbitration challenges were frivolousness, ill-founded or nonmeritorious to award attorney fees to the prevailing party. 8 7-914 contains no mention of any such
standard. The Harrisons attempt to graft onto $ 7-914 a standard that does not appear in the statute
or in the case law interpreting Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act. (App. Brief, p. 38 (arguing attorney
fees under $7-914only available when challenge was ill-founded, non-meritoriousor supportspolicy
of discouraging protracted challenges and encourages early payment of award).) The standard for
awarding attorney fees under $ 7-914 is decidedly not the same as the standards of either $ 12-121
or $ 12-123.
Courts need only exercise sound discretion when awardingattorney feespursuant to 9 7-914.

On its face, this statute contemplates an award of disbursements, which has been interpreted by this
Court to include attorney fees, incurred in seeking confirmation of an arbitration award, obtaining
a judgment and all subsequent proceedings to enforce that judgment. Driver, 139 Idaho at 429,80
P.3d at 1030. Courts have the discretionary power to award attorney fees and need only exercise
reason in entering such an award. Id Because the Hanisons cannot demonstrate based on the record
properly before this Court the District Court abused its discretion, the Court should affirm the award
of attorney fees?
The District Court found Underwriters prevailed. (Order Re: Attorney Fees, p. 2.) Thus,
Underwriters was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs for the confirmation proceedings.
See, e.g., Deelstra v. Hagler, 145 Idaho 922,925, 188 P.3d 864, 867 (2008) (affirming award of
I

attorney fees to prevailing party during confirmation proceedings under $7-914).
a.

District Court's Attorney Fee Award Under 6 7-9 14was not an Abuse of Discretion.

The Idaho Uniform Arbitration Act provides the Act "shall be construed as to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." Idaho Code $ 7-921. No
otherjurisdiction that has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act has held attorney fee awards are only
proper when the confirming wurt finds the challenges to confirmation were frivolously or
unreasonably brought or pursued. In Wachtel v. Shoney 's inc., 830 S.W.2d 905,909 (Tenn. App
9Becausethe Harrisons failed to properly submit the transcript of the hearing on
Underwriters' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, the Supreme Court denied the request
to augment the record. All references to the hearing in App. Brief should be consequently
disregarded.

1991). In Driver, the Idaho Supreme Court cited Wachtel approvingly. 139 Idaho at 430,80 P.3d at
103I. the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered T.C.A. 5 29-5-3 15, which is identical to Idaho's

5 7-914. The Wachtel Court also noted that Nevada's statutory provision entitlingparties to attorney
fee awards for bringing confirmation proceedings was identical. 830 S.W.2d at 909. The Wachtel
Court held attorney fee awards following the confirmation of an arbitration award were within the
discretion of the trial court and would not be disturbed absent a finding that the trial court abused
its discretion. Id. The Wachtel Court did not state the trial courts were required to find the
challenging party acted frivolously or unreasonably. The holding of Wachtel comports with the
Idaho Supreme Court's jurisprudence. See Driver, 139 Idaho at 430,80 P.3d at 1031 (holding that
award of attorney fees under 7-914 was within courts' discretion).
In County of Clark v. Blanchard Const. Co., 653 P.2d 1217,1220 (Nev. 1982), the Nevada
SupremeCourt interpreted the identical provision of its Uniform Arbitration Act and held that "[tlhe
award of attorney's fees resides within the discretionof the court." Id., at 653 P.2d 1217, I220 (Nev.
1982).TheNevada Supreme Court never discussed or consideredwhether or not the trial court found
the actions of the party challenging confirmation were frivolous or unreasonable. Id.
As in Wachtel and Blanchard Construction, the Idaho Supreme Court has never restricted
attorney fee awards under Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act to instances where the challenges were
"ill-founded" or "nonmeritorious." The Harrisons' argument that 5 7-914 requires such a finding
does not have any support in case law from Idaho or any other jurisdiction.

b.

Awarding Attornev Fees to Partv that Successfullv Confirms Arbitration Award
promotes ~ a r l ~avment
v
of Arbitration Awards and Discourages Challenges.

The Harrisons argue that Underwriterswasnot owed any payment because thearbitrator held
against the Appellants on every issue. (App. Brief, p. 39.) Thus, they argue that the award of attorney
fees against them could not encourage the early payment of arbitration awards because nothing was
owed. (Id.) The Harrisons miss the point. The awardof attorney fees against thenon-prevailing party
in an arbitration challenge simultaneously encourages the early payment of arbitration awards and
discourages challenges. Whether or not there is a payment due does not affect the public policy
reasons behind awarding attorney fees. These awards discourage challenges to arbitration awards,
whether by parties that do not want to pay the arbitration awards or by those parties that were not
awarded anything by an arbitrator and felt the decision was wrong. The Harrisons fall into the latter
category. The award of attorney fees against them does serve to promote the public policy to
dissuade parties from seeking another bite at the apple once they lose before an arbitrator.
c.

Idaho Suvreme Court Has Held that 66 12-121 and 123 are not Avulicable to
. -A

The Harrisons essentially argue that the standards enumerated under $$ 12-121 and 123
should be grafted onto $7-914. But, the Idaho Supreme Court has never held that the standards of

$5 12-121 and 123 apply to 5 7-914. In fact, when a party requested attorney fees as the prevailing
party in an arbitration confirmation proceeding pursuant to $12- 121, the Idaho SupremeCourt stated
that "[ilt is however,

necessary to decide the applicability of $5 12-120(3) and 12-121, because

attorney fees are awardable through $7-914." Driver,139 Idaho at 429,80 P.3d at 1030 (emphasis
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added).
The Harrisons merely asked the District Court to review the facts and law and find the
arbitrator made mistakes. These are not reviewable. The Harrisons essentially argued, the arbitrator
erred in finding that Dr. Hartford violated the terms of the Stipulated Order and that the arbitrator
erred in determining the legal effect of that violation. The Hamsons tried to couch the alleged error
as a manifest disregard, but failed to provide any evidence that the error, if any, rose above a mere
factual or legal error, which would not be reviewable by the District Court or this Court.
Undenvriters prevailed during the confirmation proceeding and was properly awarded its attorney
fees and costs incurred in confirming the arbitration award.
V. CONCLUSION

The appeal should be denied. The arbitration decision was properly confirmed. The District
Court's award of attorney fees to Underwriters was not an abuse of discretion. The Court should
grant Underwriters' request for attorney fees on appeal.
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